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Accessible summary
• This paper compares two post-modern methodological approaches, post-
structuralist and narrative, and considers their usefulness in relation to emanci-
patory research in mental health.
• The paper finds that post-structural analyses can be useful in deconstructing
oppressive practices and in indicating emerging forms of resistance.
• Narrative approaches potentially offer greater emancipatory scope than post-
structuralism as they enable people with mental health problems to restore their
lives and enact their own subjective transformation.
• However, narrative templates may perpetuate injustice if they erase the complexity
of people’s stories. This raises ethical issues in relation to narrative interpretation.
Abstract
Concerns with social justice have been traditionally associated with a modernist
concept of the individual whose actions express an underlying, essential and unified
self. This paper compares the usefulness of two methodologies (post-structuralist and
narrative) that are based on a rejection of identity of a unified self and compares their
usefulness in relation to the development of a social justice paradigm within mental
health. It considers how professional forms of knowledge may be deconstructed by
post-structural analyses, arguing that these have also been used by service users to
articulate more enabling discursive alternatives. The notion of agency is central to our
understanding of social justice. We question the commonly held assumption that
although post-structuralism deconstructs power and challenges its legitimacy, it is
nevertheless unsuited to facilitating the necessary agency to put forward viable alter-
natives. The second half of the paper considers how narrative research offers greater
emancipatory potential by enabling the research subject to author their stories and
thereby brings about their own subjective transformation. Nevertheless, the interpre-
tation of people’s stories by researchers may result in the imposition of narrative
templates that erase complexities and contribute to the perpetuation of oppression.
This raises ethical implications in relation to how people’s stories are interpreted.
Introduction
Concerns with social justice have traditionally been asso-
ciated with moral and emancipatory agendas embedded in
modernist truth narratives. The agent or subject of mod-
ernist narratives is the individual whose actions express an
underlying, essential, unified self. Marxism for example, is
a project of modernity: first, in the sense that it is premised
on the notion of unified subjects (the proletariat and the
bourgeois); second, it draws on a narrative of truth (class
injustice); and third, it is based on the moral assumption
that social injustice should be combated. Importantly,
modernist agendas presuppose that there is a real world
‘out there’ that we can understand and improve through
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the application of rationalism. In contrast, our focus on
social justice within mental health interrogates two meth-
odological approaches, namely post-structuralist and
narrative, that reject modernist interpretations of identity
in favour of what have been termed post-modern or
‘bundle formulations’ of subjectivity (Holloway &
Freshwater 2007). Post-modern approaches have some-
times been received critically for closing down the potential
for agency and for social change (see Francis 2000). We,
however, take the view that post-modern scepticism regard-
ing the unified subject of modernity can prompt ways of
conceiving of identity that open up new approaches to
thinking about mental health. Furthermore, we question
the value of labels that define people on the basis of medical
diagnoses. The fact is that categories of sanity and insanity
are more fluid than is often supposed. In other words, ‘the
sane’ are not sane all the time and, conversely, ‘the insane’
are not insane all the time.
The main objective of this paper is to consider post-
structural analyses and narrative in order to highlight the
role language, in particular the notion of ‘recovery’, may be
applied to either perpetuate or combat oppressive practice
in mental health. Our interest is in how identities are con-
structed, deconstructed and restored in post-structuralist
and narrative approaches. Our starting position is that the
self is not a unified and relatively fixed entity that has
thoughts and feelings but that identity is created through
interconnected thoughts and feelings (Elliot 2005). In other
words, identity does not precede thoughts and feelings; it is
thoughts and feelings that create a sense of self. This is not
the same as claiming that the identity is an illusion, rather
it supports a view of identity as dynamic and reflexive
rather than based on enduring psychological characteris-
tics. As Hoggett (2001, p. 42) argues, there are ‘powerful
integrative forces at work within subjectivity’, so that each
is both one and simultaneously many. The notion that
identity is fluid rather than fixed is a key to understanding
how the identities of people with mental health problems
can be reconfigured within post-structural and narrative
approaches.
The dominant discourses in mental health are largely
drawn from a scientific experimental model that identifies
mental disorder or distress in terms of either a biologically/
genetically based, or alternatively as a psychological, mal-
functioning (Lees & Freshwater 2008). In this paper, we
consider how medical and professional knowledge can be
contested by post-structural analyses. We believe that this is
particularly important in a context in which service users
are increasingly expected to behave as discerning consum-
ers who pursue and take responsibility for their own well-
being. What is often overlooked within the discourse of
consumer choice and empowerment is that experiencing
oppression may undermine people’s sense of self and
therefore their agency and capacity for positive self-
transformation [Bourdieu 1984 (1979)].The notion of
agency is central to our understanding of social justice.
Post-structuralism has tended to emphasize a view of iden-
tity as constituted within discourse; nevertheless, we con-
sider that post-structuralism opens up the potential for
agency. Finally, we turn to narrative, which we view as
offering perhaps the most potential for the facilitation of
emancipatory change through restoring the experiences
of mental illness.
Defining the terms
Before proceeding further, we first take some time to define
our use of the methodological and epistemological terms
that are applied in relation to the two methodological
approaches we discuss in this paper. We note that conflict-
ing definitions are commonplace and that usage may vary
across disciplines. In some cases, terminological challenges,
for example defining how ‘discourse’ differs from ‘narra-
tive’, seem to be more about personal preference than
anything else. While recognizing the difficulties inherent in
applying precise definitions here, we use the term ‘narra-
tive’ to denote a recognizable cultural template relating to
the narrator’s identity that is applied in personal stories, for
example the ‘heroic narrative’ or the ‘narrative of restitu-
tion’ that people tell to construct and maintain a sense of
self; ‘stories’ on the other hand refer to more personal
accounts. Our definition of the term ‘discourse’, derived
from Foucault (1980), relates to how systems of represent-
ing knowledge and social roles are constructed and main-
tained in language. Not as long as stories, discourses are
taken here as embedded within segments of language,
usually longer than a sentence, and they establish meaning
that is related to the exercise of power. The medical dis-
course, for example, establishes an area of legitimate
knowledge as well as constructing the respective roles that
should be played by physicians and patients. Whereas a
story should be ongoing and open (Frank 2005), the
Foucauldian perspective is most commonly equated with
the idea that discourse is inextricably linked with gaining
and preserving power and therefore seeks foreclosure by
resisting change and unanticipated deviations. This posi-
tion is, however, questioned in this paper.
We note that the term ‘discourse analysis’ is often used
synonymously with post-structural analysis, and although
the boundaries between the two are not always clearly
delineated, it is worth pointing out the differences. Post-
structuralism is an epistemological, ontological and meth-
odological perspective that focuses specifically on how
language constructs claims to truth. Post-structuralists
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argue that practices and identities, including those of
researchers, are always constituted and immersed within
language; therefore, researchers cannot analyse language as
objective scientists who stand outside it. In contrast, dis-
course analysis may incorporate a range of methods and
epistemological approaches within the social sciences
(Yates 2004). Wetherall et al. (2001, cited in Hui & Stickley
2007, p. 418) have identified three broad categories of
discourse analysis: social interaction (conversational
analysis), identity and sense-making (discursive psychol-
ogy), and culture and social relations (post-structuralism).
This latter perspective, which is the one that concerns us in
this paper, can be divided into at least two distinct types:
first, critical discourse analysis (CDA) that involves drawing
inferences from structural and linguistic features in text
as well as relating these to macro sociopolitical concerns
(Fairclough 1992); second, post-structural analysis (which
is sometimes also referred to as discourse analysis) that
does not necessarily involve close textual or linguistic analy-
sis but shares CDA’s concern with the relationship of lan-
guage to social relations and to how language operates
within power relations (Taylor 2004, p. 436).
In the context of this paper, we turn our attention to the
similarities rather than differences between CDA and post-
structural analysis. Although some studies are clearly defin-
able as part of the CDA tradition, CDA and post-structural
analysis are not discrete categories, and post-structural
studies often include at least some attention to linguistic
features. Furthermore, both approaches draw on similar
theoretical perspectives (often Foucault, but also Lyotard
and Derrida) that do not seek to discover the ‘truth’ or an
objective reality. With its rejection of the neutrality and
objectivity of professional knowledge to determine what
is ‘normal’ and what is not, post-structuralism seeks to
expose and critique invisible forms of power, shrouded in a
veil of ‘commonsense’ and legitimized within professional
discourses. To take an example from mental health, atten-
tion is not directed to whether or not a diagnosis such as
schizophrenia reflects an objective reality; the focus is on
revealing how such categories, which label and objectify
individuals, are constituted within discursive practices.
Critical discourse analysis and post-structural analysis (the
two approaches are hereafter jointly referred to post-
structural analyses; the use of the plural is to recognize the
differences) seek primarily to reveal veiled exercise of
hegemony (meaning how power is exercised over people
with their tacit consent) (Fairclough 1992, p. 93).
Post-structural analyses
Since the 1980s, there has been a policy emphasis on
encouraging service users (and the general public) to be
active in shaping public-sector services, particularly in rela-
tion to the delivery of health and social care [see for
example, Department of Health (DH) 2000, 2008]. This
has been justified by an ideologically based expectation
that positioning service users as consumers would result in
higher standards of treatment and care. At the same time,
giving service users more influence was seen as a way of
encouraging more active citizenship and extending democ-
racy (Lewis 2009). Furthermore, the incorporation of the
European Convention on Human Rights into UK Domestic
Law in 1998 has led to the provision of care being increas-
ingly considered in relation to human rights, leading to
greater emphasis on the principles of dignity, equality,
respect, fairness and autonomy (DH 2007). The discourse
of mental health policy has changed to reflect the consum-
erist and human rights agenda. In New Horizons: a shared
vision for Mental Health (DH 2009) and in the subsequent
mental health strategy, No Health without Mental Health
(DH 2011), the language of ‘recovery’ is employed. This is
based on a recognition that people should be in control of
their lives. However, less attention has been paid to describ-
ing the type of professional/service user relationships nec-
essary to achieve this. We turn now to consider how the
ostensibly emancipatory articulations have been interro-
gated within the post-structuralist paradigm.
Hui & Stickley’s (2007) study, with its specific focus on
service user involvement, finds that although a broad con-
sensus on the value of service user involvement has been
reached, quite different ideological understandings of what
service user involvement means are being articulated in
differing discursive strategies. In government policy docu-
ments, the benefits of service user involvement are often
extolled within the context of partnerships; however, the
service rather than the service users are identified as the
main source of power. Power is thus represented as a
resource or a commodity, which can be partially devolved
to service users. References to service user involvement
appear tokenistic, with service users generally referred to at
the end of policy documents, almost always after discus-
sion of the role of statutory bodies. Semantic continuities
with past practices are also telling: people with mental
health problems are invariably referred to as ‘patients’,
‘service users’, ‘users’, but rarely as ‘people’. As Hui &
Stickley point out, ‘If service users are at all perceived as
partners within these documents, they seem to be a very
silent partner’ (p. 422).
Studies based on post-structural analyses are sometimes
interpreted as useful for revealing the vested interests that
lie behind dominant discourse while being less helpful in
pointing to emancipatory alternatives. The argument is
that if individuals are simply ‘docile bodies’ constituted
through the effects of power, this leaves no room for
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resistance to power (Fraser 1989). Equally, if all principled
positions can be deconstructed, the purpose of social
research becomes uncertain. In other words, a denial of
independently justified norms cannot be consistent with
an emancipatory agenda. For Fraser (1989), for example,
Foucault provides a normatively neutral stance on power
that limits the value of his work for feminism (and presum-
ably other modernist projects that seek to challenge injus-
tice) because it fails to provide a basis for the development
of new agendas for social change.
Does this mean that post-structuralism can be justifiably
indicted as a conservative and reactionary paradigm that is
supportive of the status quo? Certainly, this has been a view
held by many, although not all, feminists (see Francis
2000). However, what tends to be overlooked is that
Foucault saw power as produced by human agency; he
referred to power relations rather than power as a unified
entity (Foucault 1980). While understanding that relations
of power have cruel consequences, Foucault (1988, p. 98)
emphasized that power can circulate, and individuals are
‘vehicles of power’ not merely sites where power is exer-
cised. While Foucault’s earlier work is primarily concerned
with the institutions in which subjection takes place, in his
later works, he (Foucault 1987, 1988) turned his attention
to how people can make choices with regard to their own
self-constitution. Although the self is always constituted
within discourse, Foucault emphasized that people can
exercise choices as to how they are subjected. There are
choices in relation to the disciplinary practice we subject
ourselves, for example, fitness, dieting, learning or psycho-
therapy, all of which offer their own ‘regime of truth’ that
can be chosen. Frank & Jones (2003) point out that this
does not stem from false consciousness;1 instead, it repre-
sents self-subjection – the subject decides which technolo-
gies she or he will be subjected to for the purposes of ethical
and aesthetic transformation. At the same time, the subject
can also exercise a certain freedom over the terms of their
subjection. For people with mental health problems, there-
fore, freedom does not necessarily entail a wholesale rejec-
tion of the medical model, some of its benefits are real, but
it leaves scope for a service user to decide whether or not
they are willing to take on the role of ‘a patient with its all
essentialising assumptions’ (Frank & Jones 2003, p. 185).
The notion that post-structuralism is capable facilitating
agency is often overlooked and is an important aspect of
this paper, which is addressed in the discussion that follows
below.
Having previously addressed how, in government docu-
ments, interpretations of service user involvement are
inflected with discursive constructions that suggest conti-
nuities with the symbolic violence of past practices, we now
return to the study by Hui & Stickley (2007) to consider
the counter-discursive strategies employed by service users.
Among the several examples of discursive ‘subversion’ pro-
vided, one involves a tactic of placing a far greater focus
on past practices. Effectively, this temporal ‘manoeuvre’
widens the spectrum for assessing present practices and, in
so doing, displaces official understandings that equate
service user involvement with a paternalistic devolution of
centrally held power; instead, the emphasis is shifted to
how service users might strategically regain agency previ-
ously lost through oppressive practices. This is a skilful
discursive tactic that challenges the notion that powerless
experienced in the present is rooted in individual deficien-
cies. Enabling service users to identify themselves as an
oppressed group, it undermines the tacit notions of defi-
ciency and reframes service user involvement in a discourse
of social justice.
While service users may have a vested interest in the
problematization of biomedical discourses, however, bio-
medical discourses are equally instrumental in sustaining
power inequalities between different groups of profession-
als, thereby buttressing the dominant status enjoyed by the
most powerful group (physicians) over allied professions
(Mancini 2007, Powers 2007, Zeeman & Simons 2011).
According to Zeeman & Simons (2011), who examined the
introduction of the role of mental health worker (MHW) in
Southern England, holistic forms of care that underpin this
relatively new role have gone some way to challenging
biomedical discourses through the promotion of psycho-
logical and person-centred discourses (Zeeman & Simons
2011). This, it is argued, has led to more holistic forms of
practice that do not identify the service user merely as
the object of the medical gaze. The tactical promotion of
person-centred discourses can be applauded as an appro-
priate and overdue redistribution of professional power
(that also benefits service users), but it raises a couple of
points for consideration. First, the ground gained by
person-centred discourses in clinical practice is likely to
remain tenuous until it has become embedded in the
academy where positivist methodologies continue to enjoy
disproportionate levels of influence (Freshwater & Rolfe
2001; Rolfe 2002). Second, and related to this first point,
ostensibly embracing multidisciplinary discourses could be
interpreted as an adroit tactic by the proponents of bio-
medical discourse to protect their sphere of influence stra-
tegically rather than aggressively; in other words, by ceding
some ground to competing discourses, they ensure that
these remain subservient (Rolfe 2002, p. 4). Therefore, the
1False consciousness is a term taken from Marxist theory. It describes
a state of mind that prevents people from being able to see exploitation
and oppression.
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question arises as to whether multidisciplinary develop-
ment is being deployed as a ‘discourse of tolerance’ that
acts to neutralize challenges to the status quo. This is a
factor that deserves some consideration in relation to the
shifting discursive landscapes that shape professional
status.
Even if the more hopeful view that discursive shifts are
democratizing health care is accepted, Foucault (1977)
reminds us that once a group of professionals have gained
power through discursive shifts that reconfigure their roles,
they are likely to create new ‘regimes of truth’ that in turn
reinforce their position of power. Thus, the realignment of
discourses of professionalism constitute yet another strat-
egy among a group of professionals (in this case, MHWs)
to seek the expansion of their power base through the
development of a range of approaches and techniques that
perpetuate the subordinate position of the recipients of
mental health care in new ways. This is not to suggest that
this is an explicit strategy but rather to acknowledge that
all are inevitably bound up and implicated in circuits of
power. As Bhaskar (1989, p. 80) puts it, ‘. . . people do not
marry to reproduce the nuclear family, or work to repro-
duce the capitalist economy. But it is nevertheless the unin-
tended consequence.’
From a post-structural perspective, an interest in
eroding the hegemony of biomedical discourses does not
equate to an interest in an ideologically neutral vista on
mental illness. Indeed, from a post-structural perspective,
this would not be possible. In Zeeman & Simons’ (2011)
study, the main focus on the quality of service user/
professional interventions, it does not, however, acknowl-
edge that Foucault viewed all clinical settings primarily
first and foremost as sites in which subjects are constituted
in order to comply with relations of power. This is not a
criticism – a paper must necessarily limit its focus – but it
should not be overlooked that the provision of care is not
ideologically neutral. Relationships of power between pro-
fessionals and service users need to be considered in rela-
tion to broader social relations that impact on how power
is distributed in society. The exercise of power necessarily
informs the relationship between service users and profes-
sionals, which are in turn embedded in broader social
relations. One of the strengths of post-structural analyses
is that they can direct attention to the sociological and
political dimensions that shape how power is distributed
in society. These are often obscured by a focus on indi-
vidual pathology despite growing evidence that links psy-
chosis with adverse life events and social disadvantage
(Read et al. 2005). The reality remains, however, that the
more socially disadvantaged an individual is, the more
likely they are to experience psychosocial suffering (Skeggs
1997, Moglen 2005, Reay 2005, Freshwater 2006, Fisher
2007, 2012, Frost & Hoggett 2008). Furthermore, as psy-
chology is grounded in Western discourses that define citi-
zenship according to the norms applied to the white male
bourgeois and people who do fall short of this standard
are liable to be categorized as deviant. Women have his-
torically been overrepresented in this category, which has,
among other things, led to their incarceration of women
for pregnancy, prostitution and witchcraft. Significant dif-
ferences in the diagnosis, treatment and outcomes are also
observable across different ethnic groups with the UK
context, with African Caribbean people, in particular
African Caribbean men, being most likely to be diagnosed
as schizophrenic. There are two issues to consider here:
first, the power of ethnocentric discourses, and second, the
impact of disempowerment, disadvantage and exclusion,
which are not equally distributed equally among ethnic
communities (Freshwater 2006). The dominance of the
medical model means that such complexities may be
erased or overlooked, and actions are reinterpreted as
symptoms. Behaviour, instead of being interpreted as one
form of action among a range of possible actions, is
reconfigured as representing the true essence of a person.
Although MHWs may challenge biomedical interpreta-
tions, it needs to be considered the extent to which they
may at the same time contribute to the construction of a
differently transgressive subject.
A political voice
Our discussion has so far considered how post-structural
analyses may be helpful in deconstructing discourses of
power – as well as exposing nascent alternatives. Does this
mean that we can claim that mental illness be regarded as
another sociological category alongside class, gender, race
and sexuality? Can those labelled with mental health
diagnoses legitimately be seen as constituting yet another
subaltern population disadvantaged through dominant dis-
courses that perpetrate normative notions of citizenship? If
these are reasonable questions to ask, it might follow that
mental health is a political problem that legitimately falls
within the framework of a politics of recognition or of
identity. Certainly, the case for this merits deliberation
when it is considered that mental health service users con-
stitute a group who can be regularly labelled irrational,
lacking in competence, deficient in agency and in some
cases, even deficient in humanity (Radden 2012, p. 2).
Whether or not the ultimate goal should be to valorize
mental health diversity and differences (thereby locating
mental health alongside gender, ethnicity, sexuality and
increasingly disability) is beyond the scope of this paper,
although this is an important concern that deserves to be
debated far more widely. However, what we specifically
Methodology and mental illness
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 5
wish to highlight here is that similar to other socially dis-
advantage groups (often those commonly labelled ‘vulner-
able’), people with mental health diagnoses continue to be
denied what has been termed ‘epistemic authority’ (Fricker
2007 cited in Radden 2012, p. 2). As Radden (2012, p. 3)
explains,
The mad have been excluded from the epistemic as well
as the social community, their voices disregarded and
dismissed as meaningless. Their struggle must include
being believed as credible knowers, as well as being
merely heard.
Some mental health activists, taking their lead from other
civil rights movements, are challenging medical labels by
symbolically redefining themselves as ‘survivors’, ‘consum-
ers’, ‘mad pride’ and ‘recovery’ groups; however, such
instances of resistance do not divert us from the oppressive
impact of discourses of deficiency, which can lead people to
experience the power that someone else has over them as
natural and legitimate. Post-colonial literature has identi-
fied forms of psychic violence [Fanon 2004 (1961)] when a
dominant cultural group or class invades a subject’s discur-
sive mindscape and shapes what they are able to feel or
think. Similarly, in A way of being free (Okri 1997) focused
on how imagination and creativity are often crushed by
oppression. Colonization has been central to the success of
modern medicine, with the sick person emerging as a rec-
ognizable social type. It required that the diversity of suf-
fering be reduced to a more unified view that could be
regarded through the lens of clinical medicine, which has
had great successes but can be regarded as a form of
colonialism (Herzlich & Pierret 1987).
To return to the specific focus on this paper, we suggest
that post-structural analyses can expose the mechanisms of
power that underlie expert authority – as well as point to
emerging forms of resistance. People who challenge are
often not the marginalized themselves but other groups of
professionals and/or researchers pursuing emancipatory
agendas (Freshwater 2007). Although they may disrupt the
naturalness of discursive categories, researchers and pro-
fessionals working within a social justice paradigm may
not always apply the same standards to themselves in ques-
tioning the authority of their own analyses. Reified
counterdiscourse can lead to the perpetuation of oppres-
sion by new means.
Marginalized people, including people diagnosed with
mental health problems, must, despite their starting point
of epistemic disadvantage, enact their own forms of resist-
ance. A recurrent theme is that rebuilding a sense of self, as
well as meaningful social roles and relationships, is central
to recovery. We believe that narrative can offer a way
forward by prompting a form of ‘decolonization’ through
the telling and construction of stories, whereby people with
mental health represent themselves rather than being
spoken for.
Narrative resistance?
Narrative methodologies may be underpinned by a range
of theoretical and ontological perspectives, for example,
realist, autobiographical, phenomenological and social
constructionist; narrative research is an ongoing and often
contested approach that cannot be easily defined (Smith &
Sparkes 2008). In this paper, we focus on narrative associ-
ated with the social constructionist paradigm. We therefore
understand identity as relationally achieved and consti-
tuted in the stories people tell. The subject comes into being
in and through her concrete relationships with others while
simultaneously constituting other subjects through ‘an
interactive process in which the self is constructed, decon-
structed and reconstructed . . .’ (Holloway & Freshwater
2007, p. 42). However, ‘the end result is not a fixed iden-
tity; rather it is a new string point’. The positivist notion of
reliability is not appropriate; getting the same answer to the
same question is not the aim. Life is always in flux and so
are life stories, with stories shaping life and life-shaping
stories.
Reflecting similar concerns to those expressed in regard
to post-structuralism (discussed earlier), narrative research
within the social constructionist paradigm could be inter-
preted as privileging the social over the personal, thereby
denying the active engagement of the individual in its
account of the self (see Smith & Sparkes 2008). We would
point out that while the construction of selfhood is a social
act, it is equally a highly personal one in the sense that
individuals look for meaning in very different ways. Our
former distinction between stories and narratives is signifi-
cant. Personal stories embrace the self as a reflexive con-
struction, but one that takes place within complex webs of
interaction extending beyond the intersubjective level to
include narratives emerge within shared cultural under-
standings (Somers 1994). Somers (1994, p. 619) writes of
‘. . . narratives attached to cultural and institutional forma-
tions larger than the single individual, to intersubjective
networks or institutions, however local or grand’. Put dif-
ferently, the materials that are used in the configuration of
identities may share many commonalities, but the configu-
rational acts themselves are highly personal. While narra-
tives are constructed at the personal level, they are equally
shaped by the effects of the social surrounds, material
circumstances and broader social relations, including col-
lective identities, for example, nationality, and cultural and
subcultural identifications (Holloway & Freshwater 2007).
McLeod (1997) suggests, ‘Even when a teller is recounting
a unique set of individual, personal events, he or she can
P. Fisher & D. Freshwater
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only do so by drawing up story structures and genres
drawn from the narrative resources of a culture’.
To clarify our use of the term ‘story’ and how this
compares with ‘narrative’, we refer to Harrington (2008,
pp. 94–95) who defines stories as personal accounts that
are ‘living, local and specific’, while narratives are cultural
templates that provide us with tropes and plotlines to
understand the significance of the stories we hear. Narra-
tives are also resources that people draw on to develop
their personal stories. In the context of illness, Frank has
argued that the narrative of restitution, often told by those
experiencing chronic illness, is one that is characterized by
a passivity and surrender to medical interventions. Based
principally on hope that health can be restored to a condi-
tion in the past, ‘The story told by the physician becomes
the one against which all others are ultimately judged true
or false, useful or not’ (Frank 1995, p. 5). While a narrative
of restitution can be helpful when short-term recovery is
feasible, in the context of long-term impairment, such as
can be the case in serious mental illness, it may not be
possible to envisage a future free of illness.
Individual stories of mental illness have traditionally not
been conceptualized as a collective live body of work that
offers legitimate insights into how experiences are shaped
by the discourse and practices of mental health. As Kerry
(2001, p. 269), whose work is influenced by Porter’s A
Social History of Madness, has asserted, it is time to
‘restore the patient as a significant player’. In a study of
mental patients’ written and spoken testimonies from the
1950s to the beginning of the 21st century, Kerry (2001)
argues that while patients have not been silent, their stories
must be considered in the light of the narrative templates
available to them. Patient testimonies dating back to the
1950s and 1960s are overwhelmingly based on a story of
mental illness as loss, loss of life and loss of opportunities,
always the story of what might have been. What the stories
tell are of lives unlived. At the same time, the hope for
restitution is firmly placed in submitting oneself to the
authority of nurses and doctors (Kerry 2001). Since the
1980s, recent service user stories (the semantic switch from
patient to service user is applied advisedly) that have
emerged within a widening discursive arena that incorpo-
rates the legal, political and cultural spheres tell stories of
survival, often drawing simultaneously on discourses of
survivors’ rights, perceptions of the law and the language
of consumerism. In this way, the ‘narrative surrender’
(Frank 1995, p. 16) of earlier accounts transmutes into an
explicitly political story of survival and resistance, with the
narrator newly cast as hero.
What we take from this is that if master narratives are
powerful blueprints, something always escapes in their
telling and retelling. As Deleuze & Guattari (1988, p. 216
cited in Tamboukou 2008, p. 2888) put it, ‘something that
flows or flees’, which is often attributed to a ‘change in
values’ by women, youth and the mad. Similarly, Frank
(2005) writes of a breakthrough or moment of epiphany
when people realize that there is more to their experience
than can be accounted for by modernist medicine. This
involves crossing the threshold into post-modern times –
and reclaiming the capacity for expressing one’s own voice.
While this rarely prompts the evaporation of all hopes of
medically achieved restitution, it can be equated with the
beginnings of a post-colonial reconstruction of the self. For
Frank, the post-colonial ill person sets out on a journey of
quest that is no longer about restoring what has been lost
but which involves creating something new.
The contemporary self has been described as ‘a reflexive
project’, for which the individual is responsible (Giddens
1991). The post-modern quest that refuses reflexive surren-
der can be regarded in these terms. Through telling and
retelling of personal stories new means of resistance are
developed by widening the spectrum of cultural templates
that can be subsequently drawn on in the construction of
individual stories. In mental health, new heroic stories of
survival and of human diversity arise, influencing how
mental disorder is experienced. Hearing voices can, in some
cases, now be regarded as a gift or sign of sensitivity rather
than a distressing symptom. Taken together, mental health
survivors provide the resources for the creation of new
templates that question the inevitability of the restitution
narrative.
Just as post-structuralist emphasizes positioning within
discourse, for example, the discourse of medicine positions
subjects as patients and physicians, and allocates power
between them, people position themselves or are positioned
in stories perhaps as victims or as heroes. This can offer
exciting emancipatory potential, but a cautionary note is
needed. As personal stories transform into shared cultural
narratives that in turn constitute templates of meaning, the
risk is that complexities, contradictions and inconsistencies
may be erased through a perceived need to impose narra-
tive order. Editorial decisions on the part of the narrator on
what to include, what to exclude and how to assign
meaning necessarily entail a certain responsibility. This is
perhaps even more the case for researchers who present
and interpret others’ stories.
Hendry (2007) goes so far as to caution against the
value of structural narrative analysis, which is the type of
analysis that ‘focusses on the way the story is put together’
(Holloway & Freshwater 2007, p. 85); indeed, she ques-
tions whether narrative should be regarded as a methodol-
ogy and argues in favour of moving away from analysis to
a place of non-judgement where the relationship between
the researcher and the researched is central, seeing this as
Methodology and mental illness
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 7
an encounter with no other purpose than attending to and
being open to the other. The objective no longer concerns
the production (of knowledge) but is about communion,
and as such has a sacred dimension in its particular alert-
ness to the other. There is much to be said for this; identi-
fication with the ill ultimately requires a commitment to
research that does not foreclose people’s identities by
attempting to pronounce the last word; the horizon of
possibilities and the unanticipated should remain open.
Drawing on Bakhtin, Frank (2005) writes of people’s ‘unfi-
nalizability’, that is, their ability to change, to grow and to
defy any definition that is placed upon them. Nevertheless,
we question Hendry’s plea that narrative should be expe-
rienced rather than analysed; we believe that the challenge
lies in negotiating the tensions between both these posi-
tions. Identities are achieved relationally and through dia-
logue. There is no ‘I’ or self who decides to speak. Dialogue
creates the possibility of becoming a person. Ideally, we see
narrative research and analysis as an open and dialogical
process, although we acknowledge the risk that it is likely
to achieve this only imperfectly. While acts of symbolic
violence are unlikely to be eradicated (Rabinov 1977), we
suggest that telling, experiencing and analysing stories can
make the personal, political, new narrative templates
emerge and with them, alternatives for imagining and
living with mental illness.
Conclusion
Drawing on post-structuralist analyses, we have considered
how the labels that define people as mentally ill arguably
have no reality independent of the discourse of the society
in which they occur but are in effect ‘spoken into existence
according to the values and beliefs that shape the discourse
about what is “normal” and “abnormal” . . .’ (Freshwater
2006, p. 56). While demonstrating how post-structuralism
can be applied to deconstruct discourses that sustain
unequal relations between professionals and service users,
and between differing groups of professionals, we have also
been alerted to the creative discursive strategies that people
employ in order to generate more enabling discourses.
Therefore, it would seem that the utility of post-structural
analyses is not necessarily restricted to the deconstruction
of dominant discourses but can additionally provide
insights into how people subvert and reconfigure their own
discursive subjugation.
Linking mental illness with social disadvantage and mis-
recognition, we were prompted to consider briefly the
extent to which mental disorder should be reframed within
a political paradigm of recognition that valorizes diversity.
We argued that a first and vital step in this process requires
people with mental health problems to gain epistemic
authority in the public sphere through the telling of stories
and the development of new narrative templates. With its
promise of stories not yet told, we have suggested that
narrative perhaps offers the most promising way to reim-
agine mental illness. This, however, is an ethical endeavour
with far-reaching implications for how stories might be
told and lived out in the future.
References
Bhaskar R. (1989) Reclaiming Reality: A Critical
Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy.
Verso, London.
Bourdieu P. (1984 [1979]) Distinction: A Social
Critique of the Judgment of Taste. trans. Nice
R. Routledge, London.
Deleuze G. & Guattari F. (1988) A Thousand
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. The
Athlone Press, London.
Department of Health (2000) The NHS Plan. A
Plan for Investment: A Plan for Reform. DH,
London.
Department of Health (2007) Human Rights in
Healthcare: A Framework for Local Action.
DH, London.
Department of Health (2008) Real Involvement:
Working with People to Improve Health Serv-
ices. DH, London.
Department of Health (2009) New Horizons: A
Shared Vision for Mental Health. DH, London.
Department of Health (2011) No Health without
Mental Health. DH, London.
Elliot J. (2005) Using Narrative in Social Research.
Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Sage,
London.
Fairclough N. (1992) Discourse and Social
Change. Polity, Cambridge.
Fanon F. (2004 [1961]) TheWretched of the Earth.
Trans. by Philcox R. commentary by Sartre J.P.
and Bhabha H.K. Grove Press, New York.
Fisher P. (2007) Experiential knowledge challenges
‘normality’ and individualised citizenship:
towards ‘another way of being’. Disability and
Society 3, 283–298.
Fisher P. (2012) Questioning the Ethics of Vulner-
ability and Informed Consent in Qualitative
Studies from a citizenship and human rights
perspective. Ethics and Social Welfare 6,
2–17.
Francis B. (2000) Poststructuralism and nursing:
uncomfortable bedfellows? Nursing Inquiry 7,
20–28.
Foucault M. (1977) Discipline and Punish: The
Birth of the Prison. Sheridan, Trans. Penguin
Books, London.
Foucault M. (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected
Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977. (ed
Gordon, C.), Pantheon Books, New York.
Foucault M. (1987) The History of Sexuality Vol
2: The Use of Pleasure. Penguin, London.
Foucault M. (1988) The History of Sexuality Vol
3: The Care of the Self. Penguin, London.
Frank A.W. (1995) The Wounded Storyteller.
Chicago University Press, Chicago, IL.
Frank A.W. (2005) Letting Stories Breathe. A
Socio-narratology. Chicago University Press,
Chicago, IL.
Frank A.W. & Jones T. (2003) Bioethics and later
Foucault. Journal of Medical Humanities 24,
179–186.
P. Fisher & D. Freshwater
8 © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Fraser N. (1989) Unruly Practices: Power, Dis-
course and Gender in Contemporary Social
Theory. Polity Press, Cambridge.
Freshwater D. (2006) Mental Health and Illness.
Questions and Answers for Counselors and
Therapists. Whurr Publishers, Chichester.
Freshwater D. (2007) Discourse, responsible
research and positioning the subject. Journal of
Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 14,
111–112.
Freshwater D. & Rolfe G. (2001) Critical reflex-
ivity: a politically and ethically engaged
research method for nursing. Ntresearch 6,
526–537.
Fricker M. (2007) Epistemological Injustice:
Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford.
Frost L. & Hoggett P. (2008) Human agency and
social suffering. Critical Social Policy 28, 438–
460.
Giddens A. (1991) Modernity and Self Identity.
Self and Identity in the Late Modern Age.
Polity, Cambridge.
Harrington A. (2008) The Cure Within: A History
of Mind-Body Medicine. Norton, New York.
Hendry P.M. (2007) The future of narrative.
Qualitative Inquiry 13, 487–497.
Herzlich D. & Pierret J. (1987) Illness and Self in
Society. John Hopkins, Baltimore, MD.
Hoggett P. (2001) Agency, rationality and social
policy. Journal of Social Policy 30, 37–56.
Holloway I. & Freshwater D. (2007) Narrative
Research in Nursing. Blackwell, Oxford.
Hui A. & Stickley T. (2007) Mental health policy
and mental health service user perspectives on
involvement: a discourse analysis. Journal of
Advanced Nursing 59, 416–426.
Kerry D. (2001) ‘Silent and censured travellers’?
Patients’ narratives and patients’ voices: per-
spectives on the history of mental illness since
1948. The Society for the Social History of
Medicine 14, 267–292.
Lees J. & Freshwater D. (2008) Practitioner-based
Research. Power, Discourse, and Transforma-
tion. Karnac, London.
Lewis L. (2009) Politics of recognition: what can a
human rights perspective contribute to under-
standing users’ experiences of involvement in
mental health services? Social Policy and Society
8, 257–274.
Mancini M.A. (2007) Narratives of recovery
from serious psychiatric disabilities: a critical
discourse analysis. Critical Approaches to
Discourse Analysis across Disciplines 1, 35–
50.
McLeod J. (1997) Narrative and Psychotherapy.
Sage, London.
Moglen S. (2005) On mourning social injury. Psy-
choanalysis, Culture and Society 10, 151–167.
Okri B. (1997) A Way of Being Free. Phoenix,
London.
Powers P. (2007) The philosophical foundations
of Foucaultian discourse analysis. Critical
Approaches to Discourse Analysis across Disci-
plines 1, 18–34.
Rabinov P. (1977) Reflections on Fieldwork in
Morocco. University of California Press, Berke-
ley, CA.
Radden J.H. (2012) Recognition rights, mental
health consumers and reconstructive cultural
semantics. Philosophy, Ethics and Humanities
in Medicine 7, 1–8.
Read J., Van Os J., Morrison A.P., et al. (2005)
Childhood trauma, psychosis, and Schizophre-
nia. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 112, 330–
350.
Reay D. (2005) Beyond consciousness? The
psychic landscape of social class. Sociological
Review 39, 911–928.
Rolfe G. (2002) Reflexive research and the use of
self. In: Therapeutic Nursing (ed Freshwater,
D.), pp. 175–194. Sage, London.
Skeggs B. (1997) Formations of Class and Gender:
Becoming Respectable. Sage, London.
Smith B. & Sparkes A.C. (2008) Contrasting per-
spectives on narrating selves and identities: an
invitation to dialogue. Qualitative Research 8,
5–35.
Somers M. (1994) The narrative constitution of
identity: a relational and network approach.
Theory and Society 23, 605–649.
Tamboukou M. (2008) Re-imagining the narrat-
able subject. Qualitative Research 8, 283–
292.
Taylor S. (2004) Researching educational policy
and change in ‘new times’: using critical dis-
course. Journal of Education Policy 19, 433–
451.
Wetherall M., Taylor S. & Yates S.J. (2001) Dis-
course Theory and Practice: A Reader. Sage,
London.
Yates S.J. (2004) Doing Social Science Research.
Sage, London.
Zeeman L. & Simons L. (2011) An analysis of
discourses shaping mental health practitioners.
Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health
Nursing 18, 712–720.
Methodology and mental illness
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 9
